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SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/E, A/S FRAZER

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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PINR](#) [SOCI](#) [SO](#)

SUBJECT: SOMALIA - YUSUF AGREES TO SEEK COMPROMISE WITH PRIME MINISTER

REF: NAIROBI 2643

Classified By: Somalia Counselor Bob Patterson. Reasons: 1.4 (b,d).

¶1. (C) Summary: In a follow-on to their November 20 meeting (reftel), Special Envoy for Somalia John Yates pressed Transitional Federal Government (TFG) President Abdullahi Yusuf to drop his legalistic objections to cooperation with TFG Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein "Nur Adde." Yusuf initially resisted the Special Envoy's arguments but, finally, agreed that he would travel to Mogadishu, as soon as an aircraft could be made available, for meetings with the Prime Minister. Yusuf predicted, however, that the Prime Minister would be unlikely to meet him half way. End summary.

¶2. (C) In a follow-on to their November 20 meeting (reftel), Special Envoy for Somalia John Yates on November 21 pressed a reluctant Transitional Federal Government (TFG) President Abdullahi Yusuf hard to drop his objections to compromise with TFG Prime Minister Hassan Hussein "Nur Adde." Noting that "the best way to combat instability, hunger, and piracy is through a strong government in Mogadishu," S/E Yates told Yusuf that, instead of contemplating attendance at the November 22 - 25 Djibouti High-Level and Security Committee meetings, which would be disruptive, Yusuf should travel to Mogadishu for meetings with the Prime Minister.

¶3. (C) S/E Yates told Yusuf that without compromise, the TFG would not survive to form a unity government with the Alliance for the Liberation of Somalia. He urged the President to drop his "legalistic" objections to the Prime Minister's behavior and to seek to forge a consensus with him. Signaling to Yusuf that little patience is left, S/E Yates noted that "no one person in the TFG is indispensable," and that the reconciliation process needed to be energized, as little time remained in the TFG's mandate, "which will not be automatically extended." S/E Yates agreed with Yusuf that the Prime Minister would also need to be willing to compromise, and promised to contact Nur Adde in Mogadishu in order to ready him for Yusuf's visit, should Yusuf decide to go.

¶4. (C) After several more attempts by Yusuf to discuss his alleged legal objections to the Prime Minister's unilateral efforts to form a cabinet, and after complaints (reftel) about alleged Ethiopian behavior at the October 28 - 29 IGAD Summit, the President told S/E Yates that he "would go to Mogadishu" as soon as air transportation could be found. "I will do my best," Yusuf said. "We will do what is best for Somalia." Still, the President added, he expected little from his meeting with Nur Adde who, he predicted, would be unwilling to compromise, and perhaps even unwilling to meet with him.

Comment

¶5. (C) We believe that Yusuf will travel to Mogadishu, and make at least a formal effort to meet with the Prime Minister, whom S/E Yates will urge to engage with Yusuf. Months of interpersonal conflict, however, and Nur Adde's newfound interest in advancing the Djibouti Process without Yusuf, will at a minimum complicate their efforts to meet and find compromise.

RANNEBERGER